THE COMPROMISED CARGO CONTAINER: TERROR IN A BOX

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While we cannot expect to screen every maritime container entering the United States, we need to provide some expectation of inspection, or create some level of deterrence to dissuade smugglers from using the intermodal system to smuggle cargo. We are so busy investigating in a[n] anti-ballistic missile defense system, we fail to see perhaps even a greater threat: a cargo container equipped with a digital global positioning system can be delivered anywhere in the United States for less than $5,000. Why would the enemies of America spend millions on a rocket launcher and go up against the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy when they could spend $5,000 to ship a container full of explosives or other dangerous materials that has only a two percent chance of being inspected?

— Senator Ernest “Fritz” Hollings, 2001 Congressional Statement1

I. INTRODUCTION

Prior to the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, the focus of the United States government, in terms of homeland security was on national missile defense2 or international aviation,3 not on the

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2 Stephen E. Flynn, America the Vulnerable, 81 FOREIGN AFF. 60, 60 (2002). Senator Hollings was a sponsor of the Port and Maritime Security Act.
vulnerability of its ports. This lack of effective port security existed despite the radical change that had taken place in international shipping with the advent of containerization\(^5\) and the attendant rise of a global economy.\(^6\) In 2000, the warnings of the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Ports (the “Commission”) that “U.S. seaports are vulnerable to terrorist attacks, and such attacks have the potential to create substantial damage to seaport infrastructure, with

\(^3\) Report of the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports, 76 (2000), available at http://www.securitymanagement.com/archive/library/seaport1200.pdf (“The maritime mode does not exhibit a substantial security or anti-terrorism profile, particularly when compared with the emphasis commercial aviation places on these activities. The primary reason for this situation is historical. In the U.S. experience, aviation, particularly in an overseas environment, has been by far the most visible and dramatic transportation target for terrorism and violent criminal incidents. Few similar actual incidents involving domestic surface transportation assets have occurred. Thus, each mode has responded to its own specific security and terrorist history, and has developed and implemented security practices that are consistent with its actual and assessed vulnerabilities. Additionally, the open nature of the maritime environment makes it difficult, if not impractical, to apply security measures that would hinder the movements of individuals. However, the increase in the potential threat to these facilities in recent years is reason to review this situation.”).

\(^4\) See id. (noting the U.S. government’s emphasis on aviation security as opposed to maritime security); \textit{Stephen E. Flynn, America the Vulnerable 39-40} (2004) (explaining that the U.S. government’s focus is on guarding the United States from a potential missile attack rather than protecting its ports).

\(^5\) See Robert G. Clyne, \textit{Terrorism and Port/Cargo Security: Developments and Implications for Marine Cargo Recoveries}, 77 TUL. L. REV. 1183, 1187-88 (noting that despite the fact that “[m]illions of containers pass through the U.S. each year . . ., [port] security was never a central focus of maritime commerce until the World Trade Center attack on September 11th”).

\(^6\) See \textit{Marc Levinson, The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the World Economy Bigger 2} (2006) (“The container made shipping cheap, and by doing so changed the shape of the world economy.”); see also Jeremy Firestone & James Corbett, \textit{Maritime Transportation: A Third Way for Port and Environmental Security}, 9 WIDNER L. SYMP. J. 419, 420-21 (2003) (“[T]he country’s port security focus remained narrow even in the face of three major changes in maritime transportation: (a) containerized transport revolutionized international shipping and allowed for seamless inter-modal transfer of cargo to trucks, railcars and pipelines; (b) the world rushed toward global trade and tourism in the 1990s with its attendant environmental, economic and cultural consequences; and (c) ports came to be seen as major gateways to global commerce and engines of economic growth.”).
significant national security consequences” went unheeded. The U.S. government also ignored the Commission’s additional conclusion that “threats of chemical or biological assault could represent an emerging issue for national infrastructure systems such as seaports” and its recommendation “that minimum port security guidelines should be developed” in line with its findings.

Just two months before the attacks on 9/11, the Acting Deputy Administrator of the U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration (“MARAD”) echoed the Commission’s report while testifying before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. He noted that unlike “U.S. airports and land border crossings [that] have well structured security measures, our ports do not enjoy the same level of security even though they offer unparalleled intermodal access to our nation’s interior.” Irrespective of such warnings, prior to the attack on the World Trade Center, the goals of port security were primarily to prevent cargo theft, counteract drug smuggling, and control any stowaway problems.

In addition, pre-9/11 budgetary constraints basically hamstrung

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8 Id. at 71, 75.
9 An agency of the U.S. Department of Transportation, MARAD provides programs that “promote the use of waterborne transportation and its seamless integration with other segments of the transportation system, and the viability of the U.S. merchant marine.” About Us, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION MARITIME ADMINISTRATION, http://www.marad.dot.gov/about_us_landing_page/about_us_landing_page.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2013). In addition, the Agency “works in many areas involving ships and shipping, shipbuilding, port operations, vessel operations, national security, environment, and safety.” Id. It also is responsible for maintaining “a fleet of cargo ships in reserve to provide surge sealift during war and national emergencies.” Id.
11 Id. (emphasis added)
12 See id.
the U.S. Coast Guard. As it does today, in 2001 the Coast Guard played a major role in securing the safety of 361 public seaports and patrolling 95,000 miles of coastline prior to 9/11. The day before the terrorist attacks, lack of funding had not only reduced the number of coastguardsmen, but also forced crewmembers to rely on used parts to make their cutters and aircraft operational. Unsurprisingly, the security rating of American ports prior to 2001 was “generally fair to poor.”

In the aftermath of 9/11, while the safety of air travel continues

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13 FLYNN, supra note 4, at 42 (“The Coast Guard is charged with protecting 95,000 miles of shoreline and an ‘Exclusive Economic Zone’ that extends two hundred miles off-shore covering 3.36 million square miles, with a force about the same size as the New York police department, deployed on a fleet of vessels that are among the oldest of thirty-seven navies around the world. Serious engineering casualties among its ancient fleet of cutters and aircraft are routine. And while the Coast Guard was handed more to do throughout the 1990s, from interdicting drugs and migrants to patrolling dangerously depleted fishing grounds, on the eve of 9/11, its force was pared back to its lowest level since the mid-1960s.”).

14 See Firestone & Corbett, supra note 6, at 424 (“Historically, the Coast Guard has been the leading player in port security and port state control . . . .”); Clyne, supra note 5, at 1188 (Prior to 9/11, “no central authority governed the activities and conduct at U.S. ports”).

15 U.S. COAST GUARD, C.G. PUB. 3-0, OPERATIONS § 3.1 (2012), available at http://www.uscg.mil/doctrine/CGPub/CG_Pub_3_0.pdf (“The United States claims sovereignty over 3.4 million nautical square miles of maritime territory, which comprises the MTS [Marine Transportation System]. The MTS includes 95,000 miles of coastline and 361 ports, from the largest mega-ports to the smallest fishing harbors and marinas. The MTS also includes the system of interconnected inland rivers and the Intracoastal Waterway (ICW), which consists of 12,000 miles of navigable waters connecting inland metropolitan areas, industrial complexes, and the agricultural heartland of the country. The MTS includes the Great Lakes, along 6,700 miles of U.S. coastline and 1,500 miles of international maritime border with Canada, that connect the industrial north and northern population centers of the Midwest through the St. Lawrence Seaway System to the Atlantic Ocean.”).

16 Flynn, supra note 2, at 60. (“[A]fter a decade of budgetary neglect, the U.S. Coast Guard . . . was forced to reduce its ranks to the lowest level since 1964 and to cannibalize its decades-old cutters and aircraft for spare parts to keep others operational.”).

17 Report of the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports, supra note 3, at 119 (“Security measures and limits to access to seaports and terminals vary from port to port but are generally fair to poor.”).
to take center stage, there is a growing recognition that seaports make tempting targets for terrorists and that the nation’s seaports must be secured. Logically, the attraction of insecure ports as favored terrorist targets has increased exponentially as U.S. airport security has tightened. In particular, the risk of a maritime terrorist attack against container shipping is on the rise. In the post-9/11 world, it is clear that continuing to address port vulnerabilities is critical to ensuring the safety of U.S. ports. On March 28, 2013, MARAD reported an increase in the number of vessels stopping or “calling” at U.S. ports. “In 2011, 7,662

19 See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-12-1009T, Maritime Security: Progress and Challenges 10 Years After the Maritime Transportation Security Act (2012) [hereinafter GAO Maritime Security], available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/647999.pdf (“GAO’s work has shown that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), through its component agencies, particularly the Coast Guard and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), have made substantial progress in implementing various programs that, collectively, have improved maritime security.” These “programs fall[] under four areas: (1) security planning, (2) port facility and vessel security, (3) maritime domain awareness and information sharing, and (4) international supply chain security.”); see also Jon D. Haveman & Howard J. Shatz, Protecting the Nation’s Seaports: Balancing Security and Cost 3-4 (Haveman et al. eds., 2006) (explaining the need for increased port security in a post-9/11 world); John W. Schoen, Ships and Ports Are Terrorism’s New Frontier, NBC News (June 21, 2004, 10:20 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/5069435/ (explaining the vulnerability of U.S. maritime ports in comparison to U.S. airports).
20 See Schoen, supra note 19.
21 See Flynn, supra note 4, at 90-93 (noting how easily terrorists could attack the United States by targeting containers shipped into U.S. maritime ports).
oceangoing vessels made 67,929 calls at U.S. ports."24 Of these calls, thirty-three percent were by containerships.25 Los Angeles26 and Long Beach were the top ports for containership calls, followed by the ports of: New York, San Francisco, Virginia, Savannah, Charleston, Port Everglades, Miami, Houston, and Seattle.27 Altogether, more than “2 billion tons of domestic and import/export cargo” is handled annually by U.S. waterways and ports.28

Total container traffic in the United States “doubled in volume between 1995 and 2007” and “rose at an average annual percentage rate of [four] percent” between 1995 and 2009.29 By the year 2020, it is expected that “the total volume of cargo shipped by water” will be double the volume shipped in 2001.30 As of 2011, U.S. container traffic “account[ed] for [nine] percent of worldwide container traffic,” and “[one] container in every [eleven] that carries global trade is bound for or originates in the United States.”31 Currently, the container ports in North America “handle more than 35 million containers per year.”32

24 Id.
25 Id.
31 Long-Term Trends in Container Throughput, supra note 29.
32 Joan M. Bondareff & Patricia O’Neill, Are Our Ports Safe?, MAR. REPORTER &
2013] Simpson-Wood 77

These figures make the United States “the world’s largest trading nation, with the world’s biggest economy.”

Some predict that the size and number of containerships will increase. According to a U.S. Army Corps of Engineers report, over the next couple of decades there will be a steady increase in the number of containerships of all sizes.

Vessels exceeding 12,000 TEUs [twenty-foot equivalent units], which did not even exist in 2000, will jump from 47 in 2011 to 232 in 2020, and to 458 in 2030. Vessels in the 7,600 to 12,000 TEU range are expected to follow a similar growth pattern, going from zero in 2000, to 291 in 2011, to 515 in 2020, and to 742 ships in 2030.

As the number and size of containerships increases, so does the potential for a terrorist attack. For between $3,000 to $5,000, groups


33 Long-Term Trends in Container Throughput, supra note 29.
36 Norbury, supra note 34.
37 See GAO MARITIME SECURITY, supra note 19 (statement of Stephen L. Caldwell, Director of Homeland Security and Justice, that the vulnerability of ports to terrorist attacks is due to the size and location of the ports); Eric J. Lobsinger, Post-9/11 Security in a Post–WWII World: The Question of Compatibility of Maritime Security Efforts with Trade Rules and International Law, 32 TUL. MAR. L.J. 61, 62, 73 (2007) (discussing how global-trading networks’ increased dependence on ports and containerships makes them particularly vulnerable to terrorist attacks).
38 FLYNN, supra note 4, at 88 (“The challenge of securing the loading and movement of containers is formidable. Anyone who has $3,000 to $5,000 can lease one of the many millions of containers that circulate around the globe.”); see International
like al-Qaeda could rent an international container, pack items weighing up to 65,000 pounds, and secure the door with a seal costing anywhere between thirty cents to a dollar for the top-of-the-line, high-security container seal approved by the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (the “C-TPAT”).

A disruption in the global supply chain resulting from a terrorist attack would have a devastating effect on the United States economically. For example, in 2012, the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach were closed to cargo container traffic when union clerical

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41 See GAO Maritme Security, supra note 19, at 1; see also Haveman & Shatz, supra note 19, at 6 (discussing how a terrorist attack on U.S. ports could disrupt the economy because of the importance these ports have on trade); Stephen E. Flynn & Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, End of the Joyride: Confronting the New Homeland Security Imperative in the Age of Globalization, A Paper Prepared for the Colloquium Series on Border Control & Homeland Security 7 (Apr. 7, 2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG520.pdf (discussing how a “modest investment by a terrorist could yield billions of dollars in losses to the U.S. economy by shutting down” the ports due to a terrorist attack); Schoen, supra note 19 (discussing the effects of a port shutdown on the U.S. economy).
workers went on strike and 10,000 longshoremen refused to cross the picket lines.\textsuperscript{42} It is estimated that the strike cost the U.S. economy more than $650 million a day.\textsuperscript{43} In 2002, a ten-day lockout at twenty-nine West Coast seaports “disrupted the itineraries of more than 200 ships carrying 300,000 containers, resulting in cargo delays, costly diversions to alternative ports, and unemployment lines as businesses laid off workers and cut production.”\textsuperscript{44} The estimated impact on the U.S. economy ranged between $450 million\textsuperscript{45} to $15 billion in losses.\textsuperscript{46}

Even more important than any economic impact is the potential for environmental damage and the loss of human life from the use of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{47}

Part I of this Article provides a brief, historical overview of the major U.S. port security regulations prior to 9/11. It then touches briefly on the two key pieces of legislation relevant to container security, the Maritime Transportation and Security Act of 2002 (the “MTSA”)\textsuperscript{48} and the Security and Accountability For Every (“SAFE”) Port Act.\textsuperscript{49} Next, it will examine the success and failure of three


\textsuperscript{45} Id. at 122-23.

\textsuperscript{46} Talks Resume in L.A.-Long Beach Harbors Strike, supra note 42.

\textsuperscript{47} HAVEMAN & SHATZ, supra note 19, at 2-3, 194 n.13 (“Beyond their economic role, the largest seaports are also near major population centers, so the use of a weapon of mass destruction at a port could injure or kill thousands of people.”).


primary, post-9/11, domestic, container-specific security measures taken to increase port security: the Container Security Initiative (the “CSI”), the 100% cargo scanning rule, and the C-TPAT. It will also address the required biometric credential pursuant to the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (“TWIC”). Part II traces the rise of the shipping container and discusses certain unique cargo security issues resulting from the expansion of containerization. The Article then considers the potential of terrorist stowaways to breach current port security measures and threaten national security. In concluding, the Article will make some suggestions about the course the United States might want to chart in its ongoing effort to ensure the security of the nation’s seaports from the dangers that terrorist-compromised cargo containers pose.

II. THE EVOLUTION OF PORT SECURITY REGULATIONS

A. A Brief Historical Overview of Port Safety Regulations

Ensuring the safety of American ports is not a new idea. It existed long before “the war on terror” became part of our lexicon. In

54 See Firestone & Corbett, supra note 6, at 425-28 (providing a brief overview of port security in the United States since 1789).
55 It is interesting to note that despite the Obama administration’s preference for alternative language, the phrase “war on terror” has retained its popularity. See Katy Steinmetz, The Long War Over “The War on Terror”, TIME SWAMPLAND, (Feb. 15, 2013), http://swampland.time.com/2013/02/15/the-long-war-over-the-war-on-terror/#ixzz2PPZhTsFW.

Soon after he took office in 2009, Obama purposefully stopped using one of his predecessor’s favorite catchphrases. Neither the President nor his counterterrorism team publically referred to the global war on terror. . . .

Obama started explaining his distaste for the phrase in his presidency’s early days. “It is very important for us to recognize that we have a battle or a war against some terrorist organizations,”
1790, Alexander Hamilton, then secretary of the treasury, created the Revenue Cutter Service, the forerunner of the modern day Coast Guard.\textsuperscript{56} While it is often thought that the main purpose of the service was to thwart attempts to smuggle cargo in order to avoid paying customs taxes, Congress assigned many and varied duties to the Revenue Cutter Service.\textsuperscript{57} The duties ranged from “co-operating with the navy in time of war”\textsuperscript{58} to “suppressing mutinies aboard merchant vessels.”\textsuperscript{59} The Revenue Cutter Service was “required to strictly enforce all statutes relating to the maritime interests of the country.”\textsuperscript{60}

In 1916, while the United States was still maintaining a position of neutrality in an attempt to stay out of World War I, what was arguably the first foreign terrorist attack on U.S. soil occurred in New York Harbor on Black Tom Island.\textsuperscript{61} “[O]n July 30, 1916, [pro-German

he said in a February 2009 interview on CNN. . . .

. . . .

Despite the Obama Administration’s public advocacy against the term, news outlets still use the terminology with abandon, too. . . . In a 2009 memo to Pentagon staffers, the Defense Department’s Office of Security asked speechwriters to use “overseas contingency operation. . . .” But everyman folks don’t sit in a booth at a diner downtown and chat about “CVE.”

War on terror “sums up an idea in the public mind,” says Heather Hurlburt, executive director of the National Security Network, a think tank in Washington, D.C. “It’s very specific and correct about what Americans wanted to defeat [after 9/11].” As intellectually inaccurate as it might be to wage war on a tactic, Hurlburt says, the threat of terrorism is exactly what Americans wanted to be rid of after the towers fell.

\textit{Id.} (alteration in original).

\textsuperscript{56} The United States Coast Guard Academy, A Brief History, U.S. COAST GUARD 2, http://www.uscg.mil/history/uscghist/uscg_history_final.pdf. In 1915, Congress formed the Coast Guard when it combined the Revenue Cutter Service with the civilian Life Savings Service. Firestone & Corbett, \textit{supra} note 6, at 425.

\textsuperscript{57} See John W. Collins, The United States Revenue Cutter Service, XV \textit{CASSIER’S MAGAZINE}, Apr. 1899, at 373, 376 (explaining some of the duties that Congress assigned to the United States Revenue Cutter Service).

\textsuperscript{58} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{59} \textit{Id.} at 377.

\textsuperscript{60} \textit{Id.} at 376-77.

\textsuperscript{61} See Glenn C. Altschuler, A Terrorist Attack on the City, 85 Years Before Sept. 11, THE N.Y. OBSERVER (July 17, 2007, 12:00 AM), http://observer.com/2006/07/a-
saboteurs] . . . blew up a munitions depo on Black Tom Island . . .
decimat[ing] 13 warehouses on [the island], devastat[ing] Jersey City
and destroy[ing] property in Manhattan. Five people—plus vagrants
sleeping on barges in the harbor—perished."62 It was estimated that
damages were around $20 million (approximately $350 million
today).63

In response, Congress passed the 1917 Espionage Act64 under
which the Coast Guard was the protector of “waterfront property,
supervision of vessel movements, establishment of anchorages and
restricted areas, and the right to control and remove people aboard
ships” during time of war.65 For the first time, the Coast Guard was
responsible for the security of American waterways and ports.66 Then,
with the onset of the Korean War, the Magnuson Act empowered the
President to take action under the Espionage Act of 1917 whenever
there was a perceived threat to the national security of the United States
and enlarged the Coast Guard’s mission to an ongoing duty “to
safeguard U.S. ports, harbors, vessels, and waterfront facilities from
accidents, sabotage, or other subversive acts.”67

In 1972, Congress implemented additional regulations in the
Ports and Waterways Safety Act,68 which required specific agencies to

62 Id.
63 Id.; see generally Chad Millman, THE DETONATORS: THE SECRET PLOT TO
DESTROY AMERICA AND AN EPIC HUNT FOR JUSTICE (Little, Brown & Co. 2006)
(providing a detailed account of the events leading up to the Black Tom Island
terrorist attack, how it happened, and the events that followed).
65 Robert Scheina, The Coast Guard at War, U.S. COAST GUARD,
66 Firestone & Corbett, supra note 6, at 425.
67 Missions: Maritime Security, U.S. COAST GUARD,
http://www.uscg.mil/top/missions/MaritimeSecurity.asp (last modified Sept. 12,
2013); Magnuson Act 1950, 64 Stat. 427-28 (currently codified at 50 U.S.C. § 191);
for port security were added to).
regulate U.S. ships, navigable waters, ports, and port facilities by implementing certain procedures to prevent accidents, negligence, and sabotage.69

Congress passed another key piece of pre-9/11 legislation after the tragedy that occurred aboard the passenger vessel Achille Lauro. “On Oct[ober] 7, 1985, the Italian cruise ship MS Achille Lauro was hijacked by four members of the Palestine Liberation Front off the coast of Egypt in the Mediterranean.”70 “The hijackers took the more than 400 passengers and crew members hostage and demanded the release of 50 Palestinians from Israeli prisons.”71 The next day, after being denied permission to dock at the port of Tartus, the hijackers executed one of the hostages, Leon Klinghoffer, a sixty-nine-year-old, disabled, Jewish American, and tossed him overboard in his wheelchair in front of his wife, Marilyn.72 In response, Congress enacted the 1986 International Maritime and Port Security Act.73 The Act authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to assess terrorist threats to U.S. ports74 and vessels and

codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-36 (2006)).

71 Id.
72 Id. “The hijackers surrendered on the condition that they and the hijacking mastermind Abu Abbas be given a plane to escape.” Id. “However, on Oct[ober] 10, the plane was intercepted by United States military aircraft and forced to land at a NATO base in Sicily, where Mr. Abbas and the hijackers were arrested.” Id. “The American and Italian governments argued over jurisdiction to prosecute the hijackers.” Id. “Italy would not extradite the men to the United States and, though it did convict the four hijackers, allowed Mr. Abbas to escape to Yugoslavia.” Id. “He remained a free man until 2003, when he was captured by United States troops in Iraq; he died in custody the following year.” Id.
74 This recognition has not been limited to the United States. Rather, there is now a global recognition of the need for “a new international legal framework to safeguard world shipping interests, protect coastal populations from the threat of surreptitious seaborne attack, and to assure trading partners of ship and cargo security.” L. Stephen
to take the appropriate actions to prevent and respond to any acts of terrorism against vessels, structures, or individuals subject to U.S. jurisdiction.75

B. Post-9/11 Domestic Security Initiatives Regarding Cargo Containers

1. Key legislation

In the wake of 9/11, the United States realized the vulnerability of its seaports and vessels to a new brand of twenty-first century terror.76 With that realization came vigorous efforts to quickly adopt innovative security measures in the United States and a call for the recognition that it was time to embrace an international approach, particularly regarding vessel, port, and cargo security.77

There are two pieces of key legislation relating to container security.78 The basis for any discussion of U.S. homeland security must begin with the extensive restructuring of the U.S. government in November of 2002, resulting in the enactment of the Homeland Security Act.79 This Act gave birth to a new U.S. executive department, the


75 See Firestone and Corbett, supra note 6, at 426.
76 See Flynn, supra note 4, at 87.
77 Id. at 91 (“We have to recognize that the networks we rely on today are integrated into much larger continental and global systems.”).
Department of Homeland Security (the “DHS”). 80 In March of 2003, Congress reorganized the U.S. Customs Service and renamed it as United States Customs and Border Protection (the “CBP”). 81 This Agency now falls within the DHS and is responsible for managing, controlling, and securing the borders of the United States. 82 Congress also relocated the U.S. Coast Guard (the “USCG”) from the Department of Transportation to the DHS. 83

a. The MTSA

The first piece of legislation that Congress enacted following 9/11 in an effort to secure U.S. ports was the 2002 MTSA. 84 The Act requires, or empowers, the DHS to conduct comprehensive threat and vulnerability assessments at critical ports including local threat profiles and evaluations of all aspects of security in the surrounding area. 85 The general approach of the MTSA to port security is multitiered. 86 Experts have concluded that the most effective defense is one that is layered and

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82 Id. (discussing the role of the CBP). Notably, “[p]rior to the establishment of the CBP, customs and immigration functions at U.S. borders were conducted separately by the Department of Treasury’s U.S. Customs Service and the Department of Justice’s Immigration and Naturalization Service.” Id.
83 Bralliar, supra note 78, at 39.
86 See Bralliar, supra note 78, at 4, 38-63; Wendy J. Keefer, Container Port Security: A Layered Defense Strategy to Protect the Homeland and the International Supply Chain, 30 CAMPBELL L. REV. 139, 139 (2007) (discussing the multilayered security measures used to secure containers entering the United States).
includes both national and international security measures. This approach is essential when it comes to cargo security measures due to the variety of goods transported in containers aboard a cargo ship and the number of individuals and countries that may be involved in shipping a container from a foreign port to the United States.

b. The SAFE Port Act

In 2006, Congress enacted the SAFE Port Act to supplement and strengthen perceived weaknesses of the MTSA. Like the MTSA, the SAFE Port Act advocates the layered approach to port security. It also prescribes the steps that must be taken to create a strategic plan to secure “the international supply chain.” The linchpin of this global

87 See FLYNN, supra note 4, at 69 (endorsing a multitiered approach and admonishing that “[a]nyone who claims they have developed the solution to a security challenge should be met with automatic skepticism. Effective security always requires constructing layers of measures. Each of these layers may be imperfect, but collectively they increase the odds of tripping up the bad guys.”); FRITELLI, supra note 81, at 18 (stating that experts recommend relying “on a layered approach with multiple lines of defense”).

88 See Bralliar, supra note 78, at 10-11 (“The volume and multiple sources providing cargo in maritime containers transported overseas, as well as the potential anonymity of such contents, make containers and container ships easy targets for terrorist. These vulnerabilities make containers and container ships unique security threats.”).

89 See FRITELLI, supra note 81, at 8 (Individuals connected to a container shipment “usually include the exporter, the importer, a freight forwarder, a customs broker, a customs inspector, inland transportation provider(s) (which may include more than one trucker or railroad), the port operators, possibly a feeder ship [a smaller cargo container vessel that travels between a megaship and the port of destination], and the ocean carrier.”).

90 The SAFE Port Act, Pub. L. No. 109-347, 120 Stat. 1884 (2006); see GAO MARITIME SECURITY, supra note 19, at 1, 3 (explaining what the SAFE Port Act required of the DHS).

91 6 U.S.C. § 941(a) (2012) (“The Secretary, in consultation with appropriate Federal, State, local, and tribal government agencies and private sector stakeholders responsible for security matters that affect or relate to the movement of containers through the international supply chain, shall develop, implement, and update, as appropriate, a strategic plan to enhance the security of the international supply chain.”).

92 § 941(b)-(f).
An interesting wrinkle has also arisen as to whether it is safe for port security to be “SMART.” The House of Representatives passed a bill on June 28, 2012, that it introduced as H.R. 4251 in March of 2012, but the Senate never passed the bill. The legislation, entitled the Securing Maritime Activities through Risk-Based Targeting for Port Security Act (the “SMART Port Security Act”), authorized “the Homeland Security Department to acknowledge as acceptable foreign nations’ Trusted Shipper Programs.” The SMART Port Security Act was supposed to build on the 2006 SAFE Port Act with the goal of the legislation to assist the United States in “streamlining and improving . . . efforts to prevent dangerous materials that could be used in a terrorist attack from entering the country through its port system.” Arguably, the SMART Port Security Act would also have “neutralize[d] many provisions of the SAFE Port Act by allowing the executive branch to recognize another country’s [Trusted Shipper] port security measures as sufficient.” The ramifications of such authority could result in the United States “rely[ing] on the security measures at a [United Arab Emirates] managed port . . . if the United States Coast Guard recognizes their port security threat assessments as sufficient.” In essence, it is as if the United Arab Emirates could manage a U.S. port

93 See § 941(a)-(f).
96 Id.; Jeff Berman, NFR Voices Support for the SMART Port Security Act, Logistics Mgmt. (June 6, 2012), http://www.logisticsmgmt.com/article/nrf_voices_support_for_the_smart_port_security_act/ (stating that the Act “encourage[s] DHS to really identify where the current supply chain security gaps are and determine what is needed to fill those gaps in”).
97 Hatley, supra note 94.
98 Id.
in terms of the enforceable security measures. This permits an end run around the provision of the SAFE Port Act that “changed the Exon-Florio Amendment . . . to require the executive branch to perform a 45-day investigation of each foreign investment deal” absent an agreement by “the Secretary of Transportation and the head of the lead agency on the transaction . . . that there is no threat to national security.”

2. The agencies

The principal players in fulfilling the success of the layered approach to container security are the DHS; the USCG, which is responsible for providing security on the water and regulating and inspecting vessels that enter U.S. ports; and the CBP, which has the primary duty of examining and inspecting cargo and cargo containers shipped to the United States aboard foreign vessels. Each of these enforcement authorities has instituted various security measures that specifically relate to securing shipping containers. There is a fourth agency that plays a role in the security of domestic maritime transportation, the Transportation and Security Administration (the “TSA”). Originally seen as an agency focused on security in the aviation area, the TSA now plays a significant role in cargo container security by its oversight of the TWIC initiative.

99 See id.
100 Id.
101 See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
102 See Bralliar, supra note 78, at 43-44 (discussing the role of the Coast Guard in fulfilling the tenets of the MTSA).
103 Id. at 39-40 (stating that the CBP also is responsible for “examining and inspecting the crew members and passengers on ships arriving in U.S. ports from foreign ports.”); see FRITELLI, supra note 81, at 3 (discussing the physical inspection by the CBP of maritime containers).
104 See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text (explaining each agency’s security measures).
3. The programs

There are four key programs set forth in the MTSA and the Safe Port Act that are critical to the creation of the multilayered approach to container security. First, to increase security, the MTSA requires the development of the TWIC. Second, the SAFE Port Act codified the CSI and the C-TPAT. It also required that all containers entering high-volume U.S. ports be scanned for radiation sources by December 31, 2007.

a. The SAFE Port Act

i. The CSI

In January 2002, the CBP launched the CSI. There are four core elements to the CSI: “(1) using intelligence and automated information to identify and target high-risk containers; (2) pre-screening those containers identified as high-risk, at the port of departure, before they arrive at U.S. ports; (3) using detection technology to quickly pre-screen high-risk containers; and (4) using smarter, tamper proof containers.” The overarching intent of the CSI is to “extend our zone of security outward so that American borders are the last line of defense, not the first.”

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109 Id. at 2.
110 Id.
112 Id.
113 Container Security Initiative (CSI), GlobalSecurity.org,
According to the CSI 2006–2011 Strategic Plan,\(^{114}\) the purpose of the CSI is “to pre-screen[] containers posing a potential security risk before they leave foreign ports for U.S. seaports.”\(^{115}\) To implement the strategic plan, the “CBP deploys multi-disciplined teams to selected foreign seaports of countries that have bilaterally agreed to implement the CSI program.”\(^{116}\) The CSI officials then “partner with foreign governments to identify cargo containers that pose a potential risk for terrorism and inspect those containers at the foreign ports before they are shipped to the United States.”\(^{117}\) Originally, the CSI was operational “at the [top twenty] ports that sen[t] large volumes of cargo containers to the United States, in a way that will facilitate detection of potential security concerns at ports of origin or transshipment.”\(^{118}\) Today, the CBP has expanded the CSI to include fifty-eight ports, which make up approximately eighty-five percent of the containers headed to the United States.\(^{119}\)

Primarily, the CSI relies upon the CBP “24-hour manifest rule.”\(^{120}\) Effective December 2, 2002, this rule requires carriers and non-vessel-operating common carriers to submit a cargo declaration to the CBP twenty-four hours before cargo is laden aboard the vessel at a foreign port.\(^{121}\)
Consequently, the main weakness of the CSI, like the other tiers in the layered approach to cargo security, is its grounding in “data flow. Its validity is only as good as the accuracy of the data submitted.” To identify containers to screen, the CBP employs “automated targeting tools” to determine which containers are high risk “based upon advance information and strategic intelligence.” Further, the “CBP officers are only allowed to physically inspect containers in the participating foreign country ports when authorized to do so by that nation’s customs authorities.” Absent the permission to actually examine the cargo, the CBP officers use nonintrusive inspection methods, i.e., mobile gamma-ray imaging technology and radiation technology, to screen high-risk containers. This raises the additional criticism that the CSI is weak because it results in the inspectors generally “not really knowing the contents of the container.” There is also a problem that the “nonintrusive inspection equipment used at CSI ports varies in detection capability . . . . As a result, the CBP has limited assurance that inspections conducted under CSI are effective at detecting and identifying terrorist [weapons of mass destruction] in containers.”

ii. The C-TPAT

In contrast to the CSI, which is at least founded on the logical premise of “extend[ing] our zone of security outward so that American borders are the last line of defense, not the first,” arguably, the C-TPAT

123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
does not have a sound foundation. The DHS and the CBP developed the C-TPAT as a voluntary government-business initiative premised on the concept of quid pro quo. If shippers agree “to adopt and integrate the program’s security guidelines into their supply chains,” they receive certification as “trusted” or “known” shippers. This changes the risk factor of their goods. The primary problem with the C-TPAT is that it basically gives shippers who provide information about their operations to the CBP “an ‘E-Z Pass’ from [the U.S.] government, sort of like drivers who speed right through toll booths without having to stop.” In other words, their goods are less likely to be subject to extensive inspection.

Further, it appears that “[the CBP] grants these special benefits without verifying that the security information provided by the shippers [] is reliable, accurate and effective.” According to a Government Accounting Office (the “GAO”) report in 2005, the CBP’s validation process was not “rigorous” and did not have “written guidelines to indicate what scope of effort is adequate for the validation.” In addition, the CBP had not developed a comprehensive set of performance measures for the program; furthermore, key program decisions “[were] not always documented and programmatic information [was] not updated regularly or accurately.”

The program has been criticized as taking “a complacent posture towards port security by giving companies the benefit of speedy

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128 Container Security Initiative (CSI), supra note 123.
131 See Securing the Global Supply Chain: Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) Strategic Plan, supra note 129, at 19-20.
132 Container Security Initiative (CSI), supra note 113.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 KEY CARGO SECURITY PROGRAMS CAN BE IMPROVED, supra note 127.
136 Id.
approval at the border without checking to make sure that promised security measures actually are in place at their facilities."137

iii. The 100% scanning initiative

The SAFE Port Act, which the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Act of 2007 amended,138 also mandated 100% screening of all high-risk containers coming to U.S. ports from foreign countries by July 1, 2012.139 The SAFE Port Act did allow the DHS to extend the deadline for two years under certain circumstances.140 The DHS extended the deadline further to 2014.141 The topic has fostered considerable debate, with the requirement drawing much criticism and praise.142

The majority of the objections to the scanning requirement are logistical and economic in nature.143 Not surprisingly, companies

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137 Container Security Initiative (CSI), supra note 113; see also Bralliar, supra note 78, at 61-62 (discussing the inadequate "enforcement [and] oversight" of the C-TPAT Initiative).
140 § 982(b)(4).
141 See Bondareff & O’Neill, supra note 32.
143 See id. (arguing that cost and infrastructure mandate against the 100% scanning requirement); Susan E. Martonosi, David S. Ortiz, & Henry H. Willis, Evaluating the Viability of 100 Percent Container Inspection at America’s Ports, in THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF TERRORIST ATTACKS 218, 237-38 (Harry W. Richardson, Peter Gordon, & James E. Moore II eds., 2005) (arguing for the use of a quantitative analysis to evaluate security initiatives and that, unless attack damages or the likelihood of an attack are quite high, 100% scanning is not cost-effective and noting that the adoption of the requirement could be infeasible due to labor costs and lack of adequate technologies), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/RP1220.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2013); FREDERIC CARLUER, GLOBAL LOGISTICS CHAIN SECURITY: ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE US 100 % CONTAINER SCANNING LAW, (University of Le Havre study commissioned by the World Customs Organization, June 2008) available at http://www.tradeinnovations.com/Documents/News/WCO%20Scanning%20Study.pdf
working on developing new cargo scanning technology are “lobbying on the Hill, trying to prevent Congress from overturning existing legislation to expand cargo container scanning requirements.”\textsuperscript{144}

Scholars have made the point that the 100% requirement “is not only wasteful, but it violates an age-old axiom in the security field that if ‘you have to look at everything, you will see nothing.’”\textsuperscript{145}

The DHS and the CBP established the Secure Freight Initiative (the “SFI”) “to test the feasibility of scanning [100\%] of U.S.-bound cargo containers.”\textsuperscript{146} Unfortunately, the SFI is apparently an unmitigated failure.\textsuperscript{147} None of the ports selected to participate in the SFI program, which include “Hong Kong, Oman, Pakistan, South Korea, and the UK, . . . were able to meet the 100\% scanning requirement and still keep [] cargo moving in an expeditious manner.”\textsuperscript{148} In light of these results, the DHS has extended the July 2012 deadline to 2014.\textsuperscript{149} In making this determination, then DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano “noted that the extension was necessary because implementing the requirement at [that] time would ‘have [had] a significant and negative impact on trade capacity and the flow of cargo.’”\textsuperscript{150} She further observed that “foreign ports lack[ed] the physical space and configuration for efficiently routing cargo through inspection stations.”\textsuperscript{151} At this point in time, the feasibility of 100\% scanning remains basically unproven.

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(analyzing the economic and logistical effects of the 100\% scanning policy).
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\textsuperscript{145} Flynn & Kirkpatrick, \textit{supra} note 41.
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\textsuperscript{147} See Carafano & Zuckerman, \textit{supra} note 142.
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\textsuperscript{148} Bondareff and O’Neill, \textit{supra} note 32.
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\textsuperscript{149} Id.
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\textsuperscript{150} Id.
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\textsuperscript{151} Id.
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b. The MTSA’s TWIC program

“Biometrics are yesterday’s solution for today’s problem.”

— George Jonas

The TSA and USCG jointly administer the TWIC reader program. TWICs are “tamper-resistant biometric credential[s]” (fingerprint template) that are issued to “workers who require unescorted access to secure areas” of an MTSA-regulated port or vessel. MTSA regulations require TWIC cards for all Coast Guard credentialed merchant mariners, port-facility employees, longshore

the Secretary (at the time the Secretary of the Department of Transportation) to issue biometric transportation security cards to prevent unauthorized individuals from entering an area of a vessel or facility designated as a secure area. Currently, TSA is responsible for enrollment . . . and systems operations and maintenance related to TWICs while the USCG is responsible for establishing and enforcing access control standards including requirements for TWIC readers at MTSA-regulated facilities and vessels.


workers, truck drivers, and others requiring unescorted access to secure areas of maritime facilities and vessels. There are currently 2,685,280 workers enrolled.\textsuperscript{156}

Sadly, TWIC is another effort at increasing port security that appears to have failed.\textsuperscript{157} In May 2013, the GAO issued a highly critical report concerning the TWIC reader pilot program, finding that the results of the program were “incomplete, inaccurate and unreliable.”\textsuperscript{158} Between 2008 and 2011, the pilot program tested a number of various readers at ports and aboard vessels.\textsuperscript{159} In light of the results, the GAO did not recommend that Congress use the findings from the pilot program to develop a reader regulation.\textsuperscript{160} Rather, Congress should require the DHS to reassess whether readers actually increase port security and perform “a comprehensive comparison of alternative credentialing approaches, which might include a more decentralized approach, for achieving TWIC program goals.”\textsuperscript{161}

In light of the report’s conclusions, the pilot program’s data does not confirm any prior claims from the DHS to Congress that readers would actually enhance security at ports.\textsuperscript{162} Rather, the report found that “11 years after initiation . . . the security benefits of the [TWIC] program have yet to be demonstrated.”\textsuperscript{163} The GAO report also contradicts previous conclusions by the TSA that the performance of readers at selected ports and maritime locales across the United States were generally positive and that readers operated effectively and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{155} The Safe Port Act: A Six-Month Review, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Border, Mar., and Global Counterterrorism of the Comm. on Homeland Sec. H.R., 110th Cong. 10 (2007).
\item \textsuperscript{157} See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TRANSPORTATION WORKER IDENTIFICATION CREDENTIAL, supra note 154, at 33.
\item \textsuperscript{158} Id. at 42-43.
\item \textsuperscript{159} Id. at 3-4.
\item \textsuperscript{160} Id. at 43.
\item \textsuperscript{161} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{162} Id. at 43-44.
\item \textsuperscript{163} Id. at 42.
\end{itemize}
efficiently in verifying the identity of TWIC cardholders. In response to the report, Representative Bennie G. Thompson, a Democrat from Mississippi and ranking member of the House Homeland Security Committee, said,

I am greatly concerned that despite [the] DHS investing $544 million and 11 years in the TWIC program, the program continues to suffer from fundamental problems that undermine its ability to provide the security benefits Congress intended. Meanwhile, port workers and industry stakeholders have invested their time, effort, and money into this troubled program, holding up their end of the bargain. Indeed, [the] DHS has failed to implement [the] GAO’s prior recommendations that would have strengthened the TWIC program and ultimately enhanced maritime security. After years of oversight of the TWIC program, I concur with [the] GAO’s recommendation that an effectiveness assessment of the security benefits of TWICs and the use of biometric readers must occur before the American people are expected to invest additional money in this program. We cannot continue to throw good money after bad with this program.165

164 Id. at 39.
visited Sept. 16, 2013). After funding a number of “port and cargo security pilot projects . . . over . . . three years,” the DHS was reticent to share the results of the projects. See Christian Beckner, AP Unmasks Operation Safe Commerce Findings, HOMELAND SECURITY WATCH (Mar. 12, 2006), http://www.hlswatch.com/category/port-and-maritime-security/page/6/. According to the article,

The [Associated Press] got hold of a series of previously-unpublished Operation Safe Commerce documents, which serve as the basis for the story. Some findings from the documents:

- Safety problems were not limited to overseas ports. A warehouse in Maine was graded less secure than any in Pakistan, Turkey or Brazil. “There is a perception that U.S. facilities benefit from superior security protection measures,” the study said. “This mind set may contribute to a misplaced sense of confidence in American business practices.”

- No records were kept of “cursory” inspections in Guatemala for containers filled with Starbucks Corp. coffee beans shipped to the West Coast. “Coffee beans were accessible to anyone entering the facility,” the study said. It found significant mistakes on manifests and other paperwork. In a statement to the AP, Starbucks said it was reviewing its security procedures.

- Truck drivers in Brazil were permitted to take cargo containers home overnight and park along public streets. Trains in the U.S. stopped in rail yards that did not have fences and were in high-crime areas. A shipping industry adage reflects unease over such practices: “A container at rest is a container at risk.” . . .

- Containers could be opened aboard some ships during weekslong voyages to America. “Due to the time involved in transit (and) the fact that most vessel crew members are foreigners with limited credentialing and vetting, the containers are vulnerable to intrusion during the ocean voyage,” the study said.

Id. There were three phases of Operation Safe Commerce. See Operation Safe Commerce Phase III, FED. GRANTS, http://www.federalgrants.com/Operation-Safe-Commerce-Phase-III-2777.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2013). Each phase had a large price tag. See id. For example, the grant funds available for just Phase III of container security projects totaled $17.1 million. See id. For the three-year period between 2002 and 2005, the DHS “spent $75 million to track several companies’ cargo containers coming into the seaports of Seattle/Tacoma, Los Angeles/Long Beach, and New York/New Jersey.” Ben Worthen, Security Compliance - Customs Rattles the Supply Chain, CIO MAG., Mar. 1, 2006, http://www.cio.com/article/17906/Security_Compliance_Customs_Rattles_the_Supply_Chain. The project “used GPS technology and radio frequency identification to monitor cargo from a handful of importers (including Sara Lee and Motorola) as it made its way from overseas factories to its final destination in the United States.” Id. The purported goal of OSC “was to identify weak links in the global supply chain. A
III. THE RISE OF CONTAINERIZATION

A. Malcolm McLean, Father of Containerization and Global Trade

In the early 1950s, cargo ships carried a great variety of goods ranging from sugar, bananas, and coffee to bars of copper and coils of steel wire.\textsuperscript{166} “Most cargoes came in sacks, boxes, cartons, bales, or barrels . . . .”\textsuperscript{167} Known as “breakbulk,”\textsuperscript{168} each item of these mixed cargoes had to be loaded individually or hoisted onto the vessel using a sling board and crane.\textsuperscript{169} Like a scene out of \textit{On the Waterfront},\textsuperscript{170} gangs of longshoremen “clambered up gangplanks with loads on their backs or toiled deep in the holds of ships, stowing boxes and barrels in every available corner.”\textsuperscript{171} The unloading process could be equally grueling and time consuming.\textsuperscript{172}

Then along came Malcolm Purcell McLean.\textsuperscript{173} In 1937, McLean found himself sitting in his truck waiting to unload bales of cotton he had brought from Fayetteville, North Carolina, to a vessel

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\textsuperscript{166} LEVINSON, \textit{supra} note 6, at 17-18.


\textsuperscript{168} The term “bulk” cargo is generally used to describe “commodities such as coal or grain, which can be loaded on a ship in a continuous process without packaging or sorting.” LEVINSON, \textit{supra} note 6, at 19 n.*. In contrast, “breakbulk” cargo “consists of discrete items that must be handled individually.” \textit{Id. at 17}.

\textsuperscript{169} \textit{Id.} at 17.


\textsuperscript{171} LEVINSON, \textit{supra} note 6, at 16.

\textsuperscript{172} \textit{Id.} at 17-18.

docked in Hoboken, New Jersey.\textsuperscript{174} While watching the stevedores load other cargo, McLean “came across the idea that not only changed his destiny but also the entire shipping world: the notion of ‘containerization.’”\textsuperscript{175}

He recalled, ‘I had to wait most of the day to deliver the bales, sitting there in my truck, watching stevedores load other cargo. It struck me that I was looking at a lot of wasted time and money. I watched them take each crate off the truck and slip it into a sling, which would then lift the crate into the hold of the ship.’\textsuperscript{176}

Then “[t]he thought occurred to me, as I waited around that day, that it would be easier to lift my trailer up and, without any of its contents being touched, put it on the ship.”\textsuperscript{177}

McLean did not immediately pursue his idea.\textsuperscript{178} Instead, he first “set out to become rich. By 1940 he had 30 lorries. In 1955, when he had decided that containerization was the future, he sold his trucking business for $6 [million], equivalent to $40 [million] today.”\textsuperscript{179} He invented and patented the first shipping container in 1956.\textsuperscript{180} Ultimately, he later founded Sea-Land Service, Inc.\textsuperscript{181}

\textsuperscript{174} Id.
\textsuperscript{176} Id.
\textsuperscript{178} Id.
\textsuperscript{179} Id.
\textsuperscript{181} Id. Sea-Land Service, Inc. (“Sea-Land”) was a pioneering shipping and containerization company founded by American entrepreneur Malcolm McLean in 1960, out of the operations of the Pan-Atlantic Steamship Company, which McLean acquired in 1955. Malcolm McLean—The Man Changed the World, CONTAINER
As a result of McLean’s epiphany, by 1975, in excess of “two-thirds of all dry cargoes moving across the docks of major American ports” were shipped in containers.182 “Ships of traditional design[—]whose double bottoms and sweat battens once felt the burdens of sacked coffee, spices, sugar, and various cartoned goods and absorbed their smells—became unusual sights at long-used piers.”183 Instead, ports now boast “new or remodeled ships whose holds are slotted exactly to receive and nest . . . rectangular, locked, sealed, clean, and odorless containers.”184

B. The Mechanics of Transport by Container

One can think of containerships as floating malls in terms of possible cargo types and amounts. Just as stores in a mall vary in size, so do cargo containers.185 In 1961, the International Organization for Standardization set standard sizes for all cargo containers as twenty-foot containers, referred to as a twenty-foot equivalent unit (“TEU”).186 Currently, the most frequently used container is the forty-foot container, which would be two TEUs.187 Standardization was necessary to allow


183 id.
184 id.
186 Id.
187 Id. In addition to standard dry cargo containers, there are special equipment containers with unique designs, including “open end, open side, open top, half-height, flat rack, refrigerated (known as ‘reefer’), liquid bulk (tank), and modular [which are] all built to [the] same exterior lengths and widths as the standard dry cargo containers.” Id.; see also Holly Schubert, Container Shipping, About.com, http://freight.about.com/od/Containers/a/Container-Shipping.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2013).
intermodal transportation. On board the vessel, containers are efficiently stacked one upon another. At the port, containers must be unloaded by cranes and capable of transfer to truck or train to reach their final destination. Standardization has created rail and truck companies for containers that are “interchangeable between shipping companies.” This interchangeability results in more efficient loading and unloading, which ultimately lowers the price of goods and allows consumers to purchase goods from around the world.

It is important to recognize that a threat to U.S. ports is also a threat to the interior of the country. Maritime container security is not just about transporting boxes on ocean-going vessels. It is the embodiment of intermodal transportation at its highest level. The container is part of an international chain of supply. In the usual cargo container transportation process, an importer must rely on a number of “second-hand parties to move cargo in containers and prepare various transportation documents.” In a normal container shipment process, these parties may include exporters, freight forwarders, customs brokers, customs inspectors, port operators, and ocean carriers, which may include feeder vessels. The chain of

188 See Containers, supra note 185.
189 Id.
190 See Holly Schubert, supra note 187.
191 Id.
192 Id. Modern containers carry a variety of goods. See id.
194 Id. at 104.
195 Id.
197 Id. (“Relatively few importers own and operate all key aspects of the cargo container transportation process, which includes overseas manufacturing and warehouse facilities, carrier ships to transport goods, and the transportation operation to receive the goods upon arrival.”).
198 Id.; Bralliar, supra note 78, at 12-13 (quoting JOHN F. FRITTELLI, CONG. RESEARCH
supply also includes entities that usually perform the final leg of the shipment—inland transportation providers, such as trucks or railroads. It is the inland cogs of the system that have the potential to extend the threat of terrorist attacks at ports to America’s heartland. Each time control over the container changes hands, there is a security-breath risk.

While all containers may pose a risk for the transportation of terrorist devices, the most problematical are those stuffed with what are known as “mixed loads.” These loads consist of differing items and materials that are added to the container at varying places. According to one estimate, almost forty percent of the containers arriving in U.S. seaports contain mixed loads. Such containers increase the likelihood that “[t]he documentation . . . provided to the ocean carrier by the shipping company” is inaccurate. This is the information that the ocean carrier ultimately forwards to U.S. customs. A key example of the fact that shipping companies successfully report inaccurate information is the huge amount of counterfeit goods that enter the

See sources cited supra note 198.

See Cohen, supra note 193, at 99.

See Cohen, supra note 193, at 103.

CONTAINER SECURITY: A FLEXIBLE STAFFING MODEL AND MINIMUM EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS WOULD IMPROVE OVERSEAS TARGETING AND INSPECTION EFFORTS, supra note 196, at 6.

See Cohen, supra note 193, at 103.

Id.

Id.

Id. at 104.

Id.
United States each year. Clearly, shipping companies do not report the true contents of the containers that contain such goods. Business Week estimates that counterfeit goods may compose five to seven percent of imported, international goods.

IV. UNEXPECTED CARGO: THE “TERRORIST” STOWAWAY

“A box that is not moving is a box at risk, and the average container makes 17 shifts.”

— Stephen S. Cohen

Containers are utilized to ship over ninety percent of the world’s nonbulk cargo. Consequently, each day “thousands of cargo containers from around the world pass through our nation’s sea ports carrying items we need, and possibly some that are not so welcome: drugs, explosives, chemical [weapons], biological . . . weapons—even human cargo.”

Two frequently discussed scenarios of container usage by terrorists that pose the greatest threat to port security are (1) the loaded container with the terrorist weapon of choice to target specific ports and (2) the port as a conduit for stockpiling weapons within the borders

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207 See id.
208 See id.
209 Id.; Fakes!, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK MAG. (Feb. 6, 2005), http://www.businessweek.com/printer/articles/191504-fakes?type=old_article.
210 Cohen, supra note 193, at 103-04; see also FLYNN, supra note 4, at 89 (“On average, overseas containers will pass through seventeen intermediate points before they arrive at their final U.S. destination.”).
213 See Cohen, supra note 193, at 92, 94-99 (describing the ease with which a terrorist could load deadly weapons in a container and send it to a U.S. port).
of the United States. What some may label as “the terrorist in the box” is another equally viable threat to the integrity of the port system. Prior to being loaded aboard a ship, empty containers are frequently stored in a warehouse or the quayside for an extended period. This creates a perfect opportunity for the inventive stowaway “to install a false wall at the rear end of the container, stretching from side to side and from top to bottom.” Once the stowaway constructs the false wall, he or she will paint it to match the color of the container’s rear wall.

A. The Profile of the Modern-Day Stowaway

1. The influence of popular culture

The 1965 Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic, as amended, defines stowaway as

[a] person who is secreted on a ship, or in cargo which is subsequently loaded on the ship, without the consent of the shipowner or the master or any other responsible person and who is detected on board the ship after it has departed from a port, or in the cargo while unloading it in the port of arrival, and is reported as a stowaway by the master to the appropriate authorities.

214 Haveman & Shatz, supra note 19, at 1-2.
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 International Maritime Organization, Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic, Apr. 9, 1965, 18 U.S.T. 411, 591 U.N.T.S. 265 (as amended Aug. 1, 2006); see, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Response to Tropical Shipping’s & Harren & Partner Schiffahrts GmbH’s Motions to Dismiss, Cabrera v. Tropical Shipping & Constr. Co., No. 00-9088-Civ-Setz (S.D. Fla. Jan. 20, 2001) (discussing the liability of a shipowner for the deaths of three stowaways on his vessel); see also Came Aboard
Historically, stowaways have often been individuals who were fleeing political or economic upheavals or oppression occurring in their native country and seeking asylum in the United States. In contrast to reality, popular culture has often romanticized the plight of the


See, e.g., Mary Brooks, Stowaway’s Criminal Past Turns Up in Investigation, THE ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 10, 1991, at B4, available at 1991 WLNR 4127821 (A Haitian stowaway was being “held in chains aboard a cargo ship docked in Tampa [due to] a history of criminal arrests and illegal attempts to enter the United States.” The stowaway was originally granted asylum in 1973 but returned to Haiti in the late 1980s due to criminal activity); Leonard S. Glickman, Seeking Freedom: A Child Finds Himself Behind Bars, REFUGE, May 1, 2002, at 65, available at 2002 WLNR 14778776 (examining the case of a seventeen-year-old boy seeking asylum who stowed away aboard an Italian container ship and then was “indefinitely detained by the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service in an adult facility, on the basis of radial and dental exams.”); Kari Huus, Illegal Chinese Immigrants Land in U.S. Limbo, MSNBC (Apr. 18, 2006, 6:22 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/id/12174500/ns/us_news-life/illegal-chinese-immigrants-land-us-limbo/ (reporting on twenty-two Chinese stowaways who traveled from Shanghai to the port of Seattle in a forty-foot-long container); Miami Cubans Protest Deporting of Stowaway, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Jan. 18, 1982), http://www.csmonitor.com/1982/0118/011820.html (reporting on demonstrations in Miami in response to a Cuban stowaway who was denied asylum and deported back to Cuba); Stowaways Seeking Asylum Held in Shackles, CHI. TRIB., May 12, 1994, available at 1994 WLNR 4367289 (reporting on twenty-five Romanian stowaways, including twenty found in containers aboard a ship in Boston, who were held in leg shackles while their request for political asylum was pending); Joseph F. Sullivan, In Shift, Immigration Service Won’t Hold Stowaways, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 05, 1994, at B5, available at 1994 WLNR 3850317 (reporting that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, as opposed to the owner of the plane or ship, will take custody of stowaways and parole them while their requests for asylum are being reviewed); Luisa Yanzez, 2 Fleeing Cubans Arrive in Style, As Stowaways on Luxury Liner, SUN SENTINEL, Mar. 10, 1993, at 2B, available at 1993 WLNR 4296721 (reporting on two Cuban refugees seeking asylum in the United States who managed to stow away on a cruise ship while it was docked in Cayman Islands).
stowaway or employed the subject matter as the basis for a tale of heroism.221 Examples include the light-hearted 1936 Shirley Temple film, *Stowaway,*222 the 1931 hit, *Monkey Business,* which features the zany antics of the Marx Brothers;223 *The Quest,* a 1996 martial-arts film starring Jean-Claude Van Damme as a stowaway aboard a tramp steamer;224 and the classic, *Torn Curtain,* an Alfred Hitchcock suspense thriller starring Paul Newman and Julie Andrews who ultimately escape from East Berlin by stowing away on an East German vessel to reach a port in the free world.225

In light of more recent media reports of actual stowaways “being pulled from cargo containers emaciated and traumatized, or even dead,” popular culture’s skewed portrayal of the stowaway has been revised.226 A prime example would be HBO’s 1996 film, *Deadly Voyage,* based upon the true story of eight African stowaways, only one of whom survived after discovery by the crew, 227 or the 1997 French film, *Clandestins,* a gut-wrenching tale of six ill-fated refugees.228

Popular culture’s altered perception of the stowaway not only

222 STOWAWAY (Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 1936). In the film, the famous child star, Temple, portrays an appealing and winsome orphan named Ching-Chong who accidentally stows away after falling asleep with her little dog, Mr. Woo, in the trunk of a car being shipped on a steamer bound for San Francisco. *Id.*
223 MONKEY BUSINESS (Paramount Pictures 1931) (starring the Marx Brothers who stow away on a vessel making its transatlantic crossing and, up to their signature antics, they manage to insult and annoy just about everyone on board).
225 TORN CURTAIN (Universal Pictures 1966).
226 Zharen supra note 221, at 601.
227 DEADLY VOYAGE (HBO 1996). Taking place over twelve days, the film recounts how the crew discovered the stowaways after they were forced to come out of hiding due to loss of their water supply. *Id.* Ultimately, the crew caught seven of them, summarily executed each of them by a shot to the head, and threw them overboard. *Id.*
228 CLANDESTINS (Dschoint Ventschr Filmproduktion AG 1997). As the six stowaways, which include two men, two women, and two children, attempt to reach Canada from a French port, they are confined in a cargo container 269.10 square feet in size. *Id.*
includes the victimized stowaway229 but also the modern reality of the stowaway as a terrorist.230 A 2011 episode of NCIS,231 entitled “Safe Harbor,”232 highlights the stowaway terrorist theme. In the broadcast, the NCIS team investigates the murder of a coast guard officer aboard an abandoned cargo vessel.233 The team discovers a Lebanese family of four locked behind service panels on the ship who all profess to be seeking asylum in the United States.234 As the plot develops, the NCIS team discovers that the father, under an alias, is a former anti-U.S. bomber who is wanted in connection with a 1984 bombing in Lebanon.235 One of the two sons planned to carry out his father’s dream by bombing the Norfolk port in a suicide-bombing mission.236

Charlie Sheldon, a former executive director of the Port of Seattle, wrote the 2003 novel, The Boomerang Heist, which presents another disquieting illustration of the terrorist stowaway.237

229 The tragic story told in DEADLY VOYAGE, supra note 227, is not an isolated event. Unfortunately, the risk explored in the films that dramatize the stowaway as a victim often mirrors true events. See, e.g., Captain Defends Stowaway, SUN SENTINEL, Sept. 7, 1985, at 14A, available at 1985 WLNR 1042110 (reporting on eleven African stowaways who were thrown overboard); Robert D. McFadden, 3 Stowaways on Freighter Saved at Sea, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1994, at B1, available at 1994 WLNR 3524563 (reporting the rescue of six stowaways from the Dominican Republic who, after being discovered aboard an Estonian freighter, were beaten and subjected to forced labor); see generally Elissa Steglich, Hiding in the Hulls: Attacking the Practice of High Seas Murder of Stowaways Through Expanded Criminal Jurisdiction, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1323 (2000) (explaining that the vastness of the sea itself gives rise to the mistreatment and killing of stowaways).

230 See Marjorie Florestal, Terror on the High Seas, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 385, 386 (2006) (explaining that terrorists hiding themselves in shipping containers has become an important issue in the War on Terror).


233 Id.

234 Id.

235 Id.

236 Id.

237 In addition to serving as executive director for the Port of Seattle, Mr. Sheldon also spent twenty years in the commercial fishing industry on the East Coast and worked for the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. CHARLIE SHELDON, THE
Sheldon’s novel describes a so-called Boomerang Box, a container that has been decorated by Seattle high school students as part of a school project.\textsuperscript{238} The students tracked the container aboard the vessel, \textit{Kiyo Maru}, as it made its way along its trade route from Seattle to Japan.\textsuperscript{239} Upon the return of the promotional container to the Port of Seattle, world leaders attending an economic conference, including the President of the United States and seventeen other heads of state, are to meet the vessel.\textsuperscript{240}

In the prologue quoted below, readers discover the protagonist of the novel, an investigative reporter, aboard a container ship traveling from Kobe, Japan, to the Port of Seattle.\textsuperscript{241} When the ship is barely out to sea, “terrorist” stowaways, who have been hiding in the Boomerang Box container, highjack \textit{Kiyo Maru}.\textsuperscript{242}

\textbf{September 20, the near future}

Royal stared through the lens, imagining all the hours, and days, he’d be stuck on this ship, filming . . . what? Distant views from his cabin here five stories above the deck? All the containers stacked fore and aft? The crew as they went about their totally boring duties? What?

That is, if Captain Harris allowed him to leave his cabin. This was shocking. House arrest at sea and the pilot not off the ship an hour? They had sixteen days to go. Nobody could do this to Royal Breem, investigative reporter par excellence, could they? Well, former par excellence. He drank more gin.

Suddenly light flashed from the dark container on top of the stack directly opposite his aft window. Something shifted and the sealed end of the container

\textsuperscript{238} BOOMERANG HEIST (2003).
\textsuperscript{239} Id. at 8-9.
\textsuperscript{240} Id. at 8-9, 49; see also von Zharen, supra note 221, at 604.
\textsuperscript{241} SHELDON, supra note 237, at 12-15.
\textsuperscript{242} See id.
opened, levering back like a garage door except over the top instead of inside. Red light glowed. He saw men dressed in dark coveralls and masks pushing one extension ladder, then another, from within the container across the void between the end of the container and the deckhouse. Royal understood the ladders were being placed on the landing of the outside emergency stairway one deck below his, bridging the ten-foot gap between the end of the container and the stair landing.

The moment both ladders were in place, men began crossing, one after another. He counted nine, ten, eleven, twelve. The last man lowered the container door.

Now the container looked just as it had before, dark, silent, but for the two ladders extending to the stairs. For the moments it had been open Royal had seen, beyond the dark form emerging, carpet, bunks, supplies.

The ship had departed Kobe, what, five hours earlier? The pilot let off two hours later?

What was going on?

It was obvious what was going on. A Trojan Horse had been delivered to the ship.

He had to warn the captain.243

Outbound, the Boomerang Box was simply a container loaded with innocuous “[c]ardboard flats for use as milk cartons in Japan.”244 According to the designer of the school project, after docking and unloading in Japan, the container would “be loaded with something else and shipped on.”245 It is this “something else” that makes The Boomerang Heist a chilling commentary on the possible use of stowaways by terrorists.246

This alternate scenario, where stowaways are essentially human WMDs, occurs when stowaways do not emerge from a container until

243 Id.
244 Id. at 9.
245 Id.
246 See id. at 1-2.
after the vessel has docked at a U.S. port. The unexpected, human cargo becomes a weapon with the potential to fulfill Osama bin Laden’s dream of destroying the American economy.

2. True tales of stowaways in the twenty-first century

In light of the current vulnerability of U.S. ports to unwittingly serve as gateways for terrorist attacks, we can no longer assume that a stowaway is simply a “would-be illegal entrant” seeking a better life. Rather, the potential for a Boomerang Heist scenario is not simply fiction. There are a number of incidents that have occurred since 9/11 that illustrate the porosity in the current approach to cargo security.

Approximately one month after the attacks of 9/11, an event arguably confirmed the fear that some might use containers to transport stowaways, bribing their way into port facilities and other restricted areas. Once inside the port area they look for an opportunity to board the ship. . . . Recent stowaway interviews have revealed that crew on board have also been involved in the safe passage of stowaways. On some ships stowaways have had to pay a ticket to one of the crew on board as well, i.e. bribing both port officials and crew on board.

Id.
terrorists to the United States. In October of 2001, port authorities discovered a stowaway in Gioia Tauro, a port in southern Italy. The shipping container was “well-appointed . . . complete with bed, heater, toilet facilities and water.” The stowaway had with him “a cell phone, a satellite phone, a lap-top computer and, ominously, given recent events, airport security passes and an airline mechanic’s certificate valid for New York’s JFK, Newark, L.A. International and O’Hare airports.” An Egyptian office had chartered the container slot and it was loaded in Port Said. In Italy, the container was to have been transshipped and carried to Rotterdam and then transshipped one final time to Canada, its final destination. If the stowaway had not attempted to “widen the container’s ventilation holes when port workers were nearby, the container would have likely passed through unhindered to its final destination.” Except for its unexpected cargo, the container was “nearly indistinguishable from any of the other 2.5 million handled at Gioia Tauro in 2001.” This incident illustrates the apparent ease with which a person can subvert the container transport system.

In the summer of 2002, “a news crew successfully smuggled 15 pounds of uranium into New York Harbor.” Then “the news team successfully repeated their uranium importation [in 2003] in Los Angeles, shipping 15 pounds of uranium from Indonesia past Customs

252 Crist, supra note 250, at 8.
253 Id.
254 Id.
255 Id.
256 Id. at 8-9.
257 Id. at 9.
258 Id.
259 Id.
260 Id.
officials by simply not declaring it.”

In January 2005, “[t]hirty-two Chinese men were found inside two cargo containers on a ship arriving at the Port of Los Angeles” when a crane operator unloading the containers noticed three men climbing out of one. According to the police, they seemed to be in excellent shape, noting that the containers had “food, water, sleeping bags, backpacks and battery-powered fans” mounted on the top.

In 2006, twenty-two Chinese Nationals apparently let themselves out of a forty-foot cargo container at the Port of Seattle. Having traveled “[i]nside the dark, musty, 40-foot metal box, the 18 men and four women, all in their 20s and 30s, had spent 15 days crossing the Pacific Ocean to the U.S., with no fresh air or light.” According to authorities, “[t]hey had blankets and clothing, tools—presumably to help them break out of the container—and a supply of water.” In addition, “they had portable fans to disperse the air.” However, the “security guards who discovered them would later describe the stench inside the container as overwhelming. Agents found mounds of discarded food packages and containers filled with human waste.”

More recently, in late June 2013, federal agents took two Columbian men into custody after a security officer discovered them in a ship container traveling from Venezuela to Fort Lauderdale. A security officer discovered the men at Port Everglades “[a]fter the container was offloaded from the ship onto the dock [when] a ship

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262 Kates, supra note 261; Schumer, supra note 261.
264 Id.
266 Id.
267 Id.
268 Id.
269 Id.
security officer noticed that the container door was open and he saw two men ‘hiding inside.’ The security officer ‘immediately closed the door to lock the males inside’ and notified authorities.”

Clearly, reports of stowaways arriving in the United States are not rare. If the authorities at a port discover stowaways, the authorities often take the position that the system is working. The problem with this position is that it fails to recognize that a suicide-bomber stowing away in a container will simply detonate upon discovery.

V. CONCLUSION

“If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.”

— Sun Tzu

American seaports are critical assets to our nation, both from a military and economic perspective. They are the gateway for American prosperity and for future economic growth. They are the

271 Id.
272 See, e.g., Dan McDonald, Two Palestinian Stowaways Found Aboard New Bedford-Bound Freighter, SOUTHCOASTTODAY (Nov. 14, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.southcoasttoday.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20101114/NEWS/11140351/-1/rss30 (A Coast Guard captain emphasized the fact “that the crew report[ing] the stowaways . . . [is] something that we can take some real confidence in.” The captain further commented that “[e]veryone did what they were expected to do and did it in a timely manner.”).
275 See U.S. COAST GUARD, C.G. PUB. 3-0, OPERATIONS §§ 1, 2.2 (2012), available at http://www.uscg.mil/doctrine/CGPub/CG_Pub_3_0.pdf. “The maritime industry continues to evolve as the world remains fully dependent on global maritime trade in an advancing technology and information age. Varied and overlapping international and sovereign legal and policy regimes governing the maritime domain pose practical operational challenges.” Id. § 1.1.
276 See Press Release, Safeguarding Ports is Key to Homeland Security and Prosperity (July 23, 2010), available at ProQuest,
points of embarkation for U.S. military troops. They also constitute an almost irresistible target for international terrorists. Unfortunately, many of the current U.S. initiatives through the DHS to ensure cargo container security are, to put it mildly, not meeting expectations. For example, the future of the TWIC program is dismal, the DHS has postponed the 100% scanning requirement at a time when only 4% of the containers bound for the United States are actually scanned prior to entering the country, no one has yet developed a tamper-proof cargo container, and the fears about nuclear terrorism have not abated. In a 2013 report, an audit by the DHS’s Office of Inspector General uncovered the startling fact that “[c]argo containers arriving at the 22 maritime ports through which the greatest volume of containerized cargo enters the United States have not adequately been screened for radiation as required by law . . . .”


279 See Bondareff and O’Neill, supra note 32 (concluding that port security is “the stepchild of our transportation security program”).

280 See id.


On May 28, 2013, the American Security Project located in Washington, D.C., hosted a panel entitled *Nuclear Terrorism: What’s at Stake?* Dr. Stephen Flynn reminded listeners that smuggling via shipping containers occurs daily, supporting the possibility that terrorists might use containers to transport nuclear weapons to the United States. Pointing out the weaknesses of the C-TPAT “honor system,” Flynn stated that “[t]he bottom line is the [container] system remains highly vulnerable for folks to move things because it’s essentially an honor system, and it’s an honor system of enormous size.” In terms of the trusted shipper approach on which the C-TPAT is premised, Flynn expressed his conviction “that if and when nuclear materials enter the U.S. through a port, ‘it will come through a trusted shipper’” because terrorists know that those containers receive much less scrutiny. Another member of the panel, Rear Admiral (retired) Jay Cohen, expressed agreement with the panelists that the threat of nuclear material entering the United States through its ports is quite real, when he stated, “It’s only a question of where, when, and to what magnitude.”

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286 Dr. Flynn is a “professor at Northeastern University and former president of the Center for National Policy.” *Id.*

287 *Id.*

288 *Id.*

289 *Id.*

290 Rear Adm. Cohen previously served as “Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Science and Technology.” *Id.*

The concern that the potential for a nuclear attack may become a reality is also supported by one of Osama bin Laden’s prime directives to al-Qaeda—to destroy the American economy—something that the chaos and magnitude of a nuclear attack would likely achieve.292 “Further, Navy SEALs discovered plans evidencing that al-Qaeda has identified the U.S. maritime industry as a prime target among the materials found during the 2011 raid on Osama bin Laden’s hideout in Pakistan.293 In 2004, Aegis Defense Services warned of an imminent maritime terror attack in light of the recent appointment of Saud Hamud al-Utaibi, an expert in maritime terrorism, to head al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia.294 Consequently, targeting American ports would assist in fulfilling one of the prime goals of Osama bin Laden, destruction of the U.S. economy.295 Also, depending on the nature of an attack, disrupting...
American ports could critically impact the nation’s ability to deploy military forces abroad in addition to the economy.296 Those seeking to infiltrate and attack America would most likely prefer to use containers because doing so allows them to stockpile weapons at key ports within the United States.297 Containerization has revolutionized the world in a way that Malcolm McLain never envisioned.298 The number of stowaways and the amount of counterfeit goods that people smuggle into the country, all via containers, highlight the weaknesses of the current cargo security system.299 Another indicator of the flaws of the current system to prevent a container-born attack on the United States is the amount of inadequate, if not false, information that importers report to U.S. customs about the content of containers, leading to a large volume of fraudulent goods that arrive in the United States via containers.300 There is also strong evidence to support the conclusion that “the documentation that declares just what is in a container, and where it comes from, is often incomplete, misleading, or outright falsified.”301 Such realities confirm that there is a serious and continuing problem with the current U.S. port security.

Laden: Goal is to Bankrupt U.S., supra note 292.


298 See supra Part III.

299 See Bureau of Transp. Statistics, supra note 297 (finding that there are challenges remaining to prevent transportation by containers of illicit drugs, people, and weapons).

300 Cohen, supra note 193, at 104.

301 Id. at 104.
While it is certainly true that there has been some advancement in the area of port security since 9/11, there is still much that the United States needs to do. First and foremost, the United States must officially recognize that the current selective container scanning approach premised upon the identification of high-risk goods is not working. Continuing to aim for the goal of 100% scanning by delaying the effective date of the mandatory requirement simply presents an opportunity for terrorist groups, like al-Qaeda, “to compromise . . . legitimate shipments.”

Faced with twenty-first century terrorism, it would be naive to “assume that the bad guys know who a trusted shipper is and will target a trusted box first. It follows that a top priority must be to move from

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302 See Bureau of Transp. Statistics, supra note 297 (“Containerships present unique and particularly complex security challenges.”); HAVEMAN & SHATZ, supra note 19, at 1-3 (stating that there is a strong need to secure ports because they remain an attractive target for terrorists).


304 See Bethann Rooney, Ten Years Later, Port Security Needs Remain, AM. ASS’N OF PORT AUTHS. (Winter, 2012-13), http://www.aapa-ports.org/Publications/SeaportsDetail.cfm?itemnumber=18875#seaportsarticle16 (suggesting specific measures that the United States needs to take to enhance port security); Council on Foreign Relations Editorial Staff, Targets for Terrorism: Ports, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Jan. 2006), http://www.cfr.org/port-security/targets-terrorism-ports/p10215 (“[M]aritime transportation is one of our nation’s most serious vulnerabilities.”); Douglas Frantz, Port Security: U.S. Fails to Meet Deadline for Scanning Cargo Containers, WASH. POST (July 15, 2012), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-07-15/world/35489894_1_port-security-port-vulnerability-cargo-containers (stating that the current system is not adequate enough to prevent the shipping of illegal weapons into the United States); Terreri, supra note 303 (stating that the layered approach is working, but there is more to be done).

305 See Bondareff and O’Neill, supra note 32 (“Ports are certainly more secure than they were before 9/11. But since 9/11, we have also lost sight of the critical role ports play in our economy and transportation system.”).

306 See Bliss, supra note 281 (continuing to aim for the goal of 100% scanning will cause huge delays).

307 See FLYNN, supra note 4, at 91.
the current ‘trust but don’t verify’ system to one where verifiable measures are in place to protect all shipments.”

Shipping containers are “ubiquitous, anonymous, and largely innocuous steel boxes” arriving on vessels from foreign ports that clearly can transport illicit devices or terrorist stowaways, thereby serving as “a Trojan horse for a devastating attack on the United States.”

It is also without question that the goal of having a fool-proof system, which can ensure that a container is tamper proof, presents unique and complex technical and economic challenges. It is time for the United States to rethink the 100% scanning requirement, and not just because of economic arguments. While a lofty ideal, it simply is unworkable from a realistic, logistical, labor-intensive perspective.

308 Id.
311 See Brian Kates, Harbor Fears High, Terror Funding Low, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 21, 2003, http://www.nydailynews.com/archives/news/harbor-fears-high-terror-funding-article-1.522970 (reporting that port security improvements require a huge amount of money); Rusling, supra note 282, at 39 (stating that developing a fool-proof system presents numerous technical challenges and requires companies to share proprietary technology).
312 See infra notes 313-24 and accompanying text; see also, Nicholas Allen, Perspectives in Responsible Sourcing: EU Criticizes US 100% Cargo Scan Requirement, TYPEPAD (May 22, 2008, 5:37 AM), http://cscc.typepad.com/responsiblesourcing/2008/05/eu-criticizes-u.html (stating that the EU has been critical of the 100% scanning requirement); Stephen Heifetz, What to do with Really Dumb Laws: A Look at Security Laws for Maritime and Air Cargo and Why They Can’t Effectively Be Enforced, SUPPLY & DEMAND CHAIN (Sept. 2, 2011), http://www.sdexec.com/article/10323420/a-look-at-security-laws-for-maritime-and-air-cargo-and-why-they-cant-effectively-be-enforced (noting that the 100% scanning requirement is now “widely considered to be pure folly”).
313 See supra note 311 and accompanying text.
314 See infra notes 315-16 and accompanying text; see also Roger Hailey, US Warned 100% Scanning at Box Ports ‘Unworkable,’ LLOYD’S LIST, July 23, 2010, at 1, available at http://mastershipping.blog.com/files/2010/07/Lloyds-List-2010.7.23.pdf (noting that 100% scanning of maritime containers requires a great deal of
As former Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, Janet Napolitano, recognized, “There are a lot of ways to protect the ports of the United States . . . from dangerous cargo.” “It makes no sense, she argued, to blindly strive to meet an inspection mandate ‘if it’s not feasible, practical, affordable or causes undue interference with cargo.’” An extension of the deadline for the mandate to 2014 does not change the accuracy of her former statement. The sound basis for any scanning requirement must be rooted in a risk-based approach that emphasizes quality over the quantity of scanning and that capitalizes on current technologies, not those of the future that may never be realized. Clearly, the current scanning methods are ineffective. Perhaps the problem is that the focus seems to be on inspections rather than “on developing more transparent and better designed and controlled global supply chain processes.” Arguably, absent such focus, “100 percent inspection of cargo is a means to many technological resources and greater manpower).


317 Id.

318 DHS Waives Deadline for 100% Box Scans, INT’L FED’N OF CUSTOMS BROKERS ASS’N (May 11, 2012, 8:54 AM), http://www.ifcba.org/content/dhs-waives-deadline-100-box-scans.

319 See supra text accompanying note 317.

320 See Heifetz, supra note 312 (stating that collecting data about cargo and subjecting high-risk cargo to a special level of scrutiny is the best way to enhance port security).

321 See id. (noting that the U.S. government currently lacks adequate technology to accomplish mass scanning).

322 See supra text accompanying notes 299; HAVEMAN & SHATZ, supra note 19, at 3 (noting that “the vulnerability of the maritime transportation system is extremely high.”).

ends, except a more secure supply chain.”

Concentrating on creating a container that will let a handler know that it has been compromised is the better route to take. For example, in 2006, the Space and Naval Warfare System Center awarded the University of Maine in conjunction with Maine Secure Composites, LLC, a technology spinoff from the university’s composite labs, a grant in excess of $12 million for development and prototyping of Composite Anti-Tamper Containers . . . for maritime cargo transport.”

Another key issue is providing complete funding for the Port Security Grant Program (the “PSGP”) with an emphasis on improving seals for containers. Pursuant to its charges under the MTSA, the DHS established the PSGP, “a risk based grant program to support maritime security risk management.” The Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”) administers the program. The purpose of grant-awarded funding is to implement the “Area Maritime Security Plans . . . and Facility Security Plans . . . among port authorities, facility operators, and [s]tate and local government agencies that are required to provide port security services.” Those entities are to use the awarded funds, inter alia, to “fund pilot programs . . . [and] to examine or develop” a more effective seal for shipping cargo containers in order to track the contents of a specific container.

During 2008 and 2009, the funding for the PSGP “was at its

324 Id.
328 Bondareff & O’Neil, supra note 32.
329 FY 2013 Port Security Grant Program, supra note 327.
authorized level . . . at nearly $400 million each year. 331 However, beginning with 2010, the funding level has “eroded leaving the program funded at only $97.5 million in [fiscal year] 2012, the lowest level . . . since its inception in 2002.” 332 The decrease in funding is strong evidence that the security of cargo containers and of U.S. ports is no longer a primary concern. The major decrease in port security funding is not only foolish, but it could be tragic. “Our economy, our safety, and our national defense depend largely on how well we can protect our seaports, and cuts in federal funding present significant challenges” in maintaining port security. 333 The 9/11 Commission Report made it clear that “opportunities to do harm are as great, or greater, in maritime and surface transportation” as they are in any land-based transportation sector. 334 It is of paramount importance that Congress once again prioritizes cargo and port security by increasing the PSGP funding to the authorized level. 335

While not the subject of this Article, suggestions for increasing cargo security would not be complete without touching upon the need to reconsider the onus placed upon the vessel owner in terms of liability for cargo 336 and the financial burdens placed on carriers who transport a stowaway. 337 Current laws encourage inhumane actions against stowaways 338 and discourage carriers from improving container security

332 Id.
333 Id.
334 Id.
335 Id.
338 See id.
by examining containers. 339 The master of a vessel is there to protect the interests of the carrier, not the shipper. 340 The age-old rules for a master are to (1) never accept a damaged container and (2) never open a container loaded onto the vessel.

Perhaps the way to achieve all of these goals is to create an additional “lead agency in [the] DHS for port security,” 342 which would also be of great assistance in achieving the goal of hardening and heightening the requisite cargo container security level.

339 See Maney, supra note 336, at 329-31 (“Once a shipper closes a container, it is not in the carrier’s interest to open the container again, because should cargo arrive at its destination damaged, it would be much easier for the shipper to prove that the carrier’s negligence caused the damage if the container had been opened after it left the control of the shipper.”); Booth & Altenbrun, supra note 337, at 46-47. “While some provisions, such as the imposition of fines and placing financial responsibility for the stowaway on the shipowner, are intended to provide incentives for shipowners to take measures to prevent stowaways, statistics show that both the current statutory regime and shipowners’ prevention measures have been unsuccessful.” Id. at 46. With the advent of the cargo container, “today’s stowaway is more likely to load himself, and perhaps several neighbors and relatives, into a container.” Id. Consequently, “there is currently little the carrier can do to either prevent or even detect the stowaway.” Id. In light of “these circumstances, the present system of shifting the entire cost of the stowaway problem to the carrier seems to be unfair.” Id. at 46-47; see also Robert M. Jarvis, Rusting in Drydock: Stowaways, Shipowners and the Administrative Penalty Provision of INA Section 273(d), 13 TUL. MAR. L.J. 25 (1998) (discussing the inability of section 273(d) to deter stowaways); David A. Nourse, Detention of Stowaways: Who Should Bear the Cost?, 6 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 435 (1994) (discussing the detention of stowaways and how detention should be the responsibility of shipowners while stowaways are on the ship but the responsibility of the public, i.e., the government, once stowaways get off the ship).


341 Id.; see Maney, supra note 336, at 330-32 (discussing the burden of proof in a cargo claim and the current disincentives for a carrier to increase container inspections).

342 Bondareff & O’Neil, supra note 32.

343 See id. (discussing different programs that would help strengthen port and container security).
The hope is that continued adoption and use of new technologies,\(^\text{344}\) tightening security at port facilities, and learning to think outside of the box in terms of expanding the focus of security measures beyond cartographic borders will ultimately result in physical, economic, and environmental safety for the people and ports of the United States.

It is, however, also important to remain ever vigilant. On September 5, 2013, *Bloomberg Businessweek* published an article about the world’s largest container ship.\(^\text{345}\) The blurb for the full article reads,

> On a dry-dock in South Korea[,] Maersk is building the world’s biggest ship. A container vessel, it will ply the route between Northern Europe and China. It is called the Triple-E and the Danish shipbuilder has ordered 20 of them, at a cost of $185 million each. A Triple-E, in one trip, could transport more [than] 182 million iPads, or 111 million pairs of shoes, from Shanghai to Rotterdam. Stood on its stern, its bow would stretch 19 meters above the roof of the Empire State Building.\(^\text{346}\)


\(^{346}\) Video of World’s Biggest Ship, *BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK VIDEOS*, http://www.businessweek.com/videos/2013-09-04/worlds-biggest-ship-the-185m-maersk-triple-e. Bigger, however, does not necessarily mean better. See Chris Jasper, *The World’s Largest Ship, Maersk’s Triple -E, May Be Too Large*, *BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK MAG.* (Apr. 25, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-04-25/the-worlds-largest-ship-maersks-triple-e-may-be-too-large (“Maersk . . . Line’s Triple-E class container supership will be the biggest vessel afloat when it enters service in July, with a capacity of 18,000 20-foot boxes. Unfortunately for the world’s largest shipping line, the $190 million Triple-E is too big for any port in the Americas and can’t make it through the Panama Canal. That restricts it to an Asia-Europe market, where growth in cargo demand is weaker than forecast when Maersk ordered 20 of the megaships two years ago from Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering
In a time ripe for maritime terrorists to employ containers to deliver destruction, a vessel of such magnitude calls to mind the wise words of the Trojan priest, Laocoön: “Equo ne credite, Teucri. Quidquid id est, timeo Danaos et dona ferentes.”